

**KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND ACTION:
CHALLENGES FACING THE GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT**

D.L. Sheth

CENTRE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES, SURAT
UNIVERSITY CAMPUS, UDHNA MAGDALLA ROAD
SURAT - 395 007

KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND ACTION: CHALLENGES FACING THE GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

D.L. Sheth

PREFACE

The Centre for Social Studies has created an endowment fund to honour late Prof. I.P. Desai, the founder-Director of the Centre. As part of the programme, we have instituted the I.P. Desai Memorial Lecture series. Prof. D.L. Sheth delivered the eleventh lecture entitled 'Knowledge, Power and Action: Challenges Facing the Grassroots Movements for Alternative Development'. It gives us great pleasure to make this lecture available to a wider academic community.

We are grateful to Prof. D.L. Sheth for having readily responded to our invitation to deliver the lecture. I must thank my colleague Dr. Babasaheb Kazi for preparing the copy for the press.

July 2000

Vidyut Joshi

Centre for Social Studies
Surat - 395 007

I am deeply grateful to the Centre for Social Studies for asking me to give the 15th I.P. Desai Memorial Lecture; it indeed is for me a matter of great honour, and a privilege. I also look upon it as an opportunity to acknowledge, publicly, the intellectual debt I owe to Professor I.P. Desai. Those aware of Professor Desai's contribution to the field of social knowledge, will easily recognize the leads I have got and the insights I have used from his writings in developing my argument in this lecture, that is, conceiving participative-action research as a mode of social intervention aimed at breaking the prevailing nexus between social science knowledge and elite-power in the society. I particularly refer to his wide ranging comments and some seminar articles in the area of sociology of knowledge, especially those contained in the volume: *Craft of Sociology and Other Essays*. I hope my thus paying tributes to my teacher, Professor Desai, will not be seen as an attempt to cover myself against any criticism that the contents of this lecture may draw; for, I fully own the responsibility for the argument and for the terms in which it is made here.

The gap between the world of knowledge and the world of action, although perennial, is probably the widest in the area of development. In no other field is there such a sharp divergence between rational statements about what is objectively possible to achieve, about the direction in which developmental change should take place and the real-life processes that criss-cross the lines of development and non-development, change and *status quo*. And, paradoxically, it is in the area of development that the justification of knowledge is often sought through action. Thus, while the codified knowledge about development seems to have increased a great deal, the reality of underdevelopment of the vast populations of the world is left far behind.

It is no longer credible to characterise this situation as one involving the usual time-lags -- either between knowledge and action or between the 'developed' and 'developing'. It is not a question of chronological time it

takes knowledge to translate into action or the time that an 'underdeveloped' society takes to become 'developed'. It is about the gap that has now become more or less a permanent divide between elites in the society who, aided by the knowledge-power nexus, exercise control of development, and the ordinary people who, in practice, are denied development. My purpose here is to examine the relationship between the prevalent form of social knowledge and the political power of elites, and show how this relationship has given rise to an ideology of development which totalises developmental aspirations of people but denies them actual development, i.e. any role in defining or realizing it for themselves.

A small but significant section of social activists and intellectuals in India is opposed to such an idea of development. In their view Development (with a capital D) is purveyed by the developers of the world as an universal paradigm and a totalist ideology, not only of economic growth, but of managing the social, political and cultural life of an entire society; it is premised on complete homogenization of taste, life-styles, - political ideologies and world views - of people everywhere in the world. However, in reality, like any totalist ideology, Development seeks to create a monopoly of knowledge and concentration of power for a small elite in the society. Far from producing homogeneity it establishes an elite hegemony, simultaneously over the knowledge system and the power system. The idea of 'action' then gets confined to what is called developmental action, i.e. inducing, and if possible compelling, people to make such choices and do things that the elites believe are good for them. Of course, for ensuring what is good for the 'development' of people, the elites see to it that they acquire and retain institutional control of the state as well as the power to manipulate the markets. Now that the state itself has undertaken to assist and expand the market as a means of its integration, rather its own subordination, to the world capitalist system, the elites in the so-called developing countries have begun to join the ranks of the global, metropolitan elites. This is sought to be achieved by them through freeing the capital, but continuing control over the agricultural and labour markets.

This concept of 'action' as economic and cultural integration of elites at the global level and establishing their political and cultural hegemony at the national level is implied in the idea of Development and in its new

incarnation as Globalisation. Or, this is how the social activists and intellectuals opposed to the idea of Development see it.

The justification of this view of 'action' is claimed by the developers - i.e. the bureaucratic, technocratic, managerial and business elites - on the basis of 'scientific knowledge' which the idea of Development is supposed to represent. Such a view of 'action' however, seeks to depoliticise development and disregard the vital dimension of collective action, namely addressing to issues of divergence of interests involved in the process of development. The result is that the politics of interests has assumed a form of violent conflicts among different social and cultural identities, not always divided by economic interest. The de-linking of economic interests from the politics of identities has, ironically, consolidated elite power even as it has intensified turmoil in the society. In view of the social activists opposing the 'development projects', the post-colonial model of Development while it has further empowered and expanded the elite formation in the society, it has rendered the people and the local communities powerless. Despite whatever power democracy has given them, people have become powerless about making choices for their own development.

It is in this context that a section of activists and intellectuals conceive social action in terms of protests against Development and as movements for alternative development. They base their politics in the contradiction that Development has brought about between the growing economic and political power of the elites and powerlessness of the people. In their view it has caused pulverization of the society, destruction of ecology, disruption of cultures and livelihood patterns and a massive erosion of individual and collective rights of the people.¹ While they oppose the destructive aspects of the Development model the movements for alternative development are for ensuring well-being of the people - i.e. a dignified but not an ever-escalating standard of living. Their politics today is mainly in the form of critiques and a variety of protests

¹ See for example, Claude Alvares, 'Deadly Development', *Development Forum*, Vol. 9, No. 7, (October 1983); Ashis Nandy, 'Development and Authoritarianism', *Journal for Entwicklungspolitik*, November 1986.

against Development. But their long-term goal is to evolve an alternative approach to development which is more holistic, one which transcends gross-economism and addresses issues of material as well as spiritual well-being of people.

Despite all this, as yet there is insufficient awareness among social activists about how the prevalent nexus between the knowledge and the power systems can, and does, frustrate their efforts to reverse the destructive forces of Development. If social activists working for alternative development, continue to uncritically accept and work with the models and solutions dispensed by the established social science paradigm which is intrinsically linked to the elite power in the society, they can not escape their co-optation by the prevalent Development establishment.²

Thus viewed, the challenge to movements for alternative development in India is primarily political. At one level it is about changing the discourse on development. This would require bringing up-front the civilisational experience and the indigenous knowledge systems of the society in the development debate. At another level it is about making the State responsive to developmental needs and aspirations of cultural pluralities in the society. In effect, development will have to be conceived as a bottom-upward process in which people produce, acquire and share among them such knowledge (of means and values) as they need for their own development, rather than depend on any reified system of knowledge that they can not claim as their own. More importantly, it would mean pluralising the totalist Ideology of Development in terms of local democracy.

It is in the above perspective that I shall first examine the relationship between positivist social-knowledge and the conventional model of

² The issue of co-optation of grassroots movements by the Development establishment has been widely debated since mid 1980. For details see 'On Threats to Non-party Political Process: A Report' on a debate on this issue see *Lokayan Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April 1985). For a more extensive debate on this issue see *Lokayan Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 3/4, pp. 1-5. Citations: by R.K. and Buker Roy.

development and show how this relationship has coagulated into an elite power-structure in the society. Next, I shall critically examine the response of the grassroots movements for alternative development to the conventional model of development and elucidate some elements of a new knowledge system being developed by the movements at the local level.

I

A Critique of Positivist Social Science Knowledge

The practice of social science, broadly described as 'the scientific method', (hereafter 'the method') is by and large located in the positivist frame of knowledge. At the heart of it is the view of social reality - a reality 'out-there' which can be observed and described and manipulated like a 'thing' in the physical world. The method, therefore, consists in the systematisation of observed facts about that reality; that which is not observed does not exist or exists only inferentially and can only be known in terms of what is observed. In this view, thus, *scientific* method is the only way of acquiring valid social knowledge. This view has far-reaching implications for the world of action, especially for the kind of thinking and action it promotes or inhibits in the field of development.

Firstly, led by the assumption of scientificity of social knowledge the 'positivists' treat social reality as analogous to physical reality, which the method seeks to observe and 'explain'. It is the method that makes the reality 'real'. The reality's sole function is to serve the knowledge process. The reverse proposition, if any one at all thinks of it, becomes incidental to the agenda of social sciences. It is put outside and far away from the knowledge system. Any commitment to (preserve or change) the social reality although it may occur 'unwittingly', is to be avoided assiduously in the practice of positivist knowledge, for it 'interferes' with the notion of 'objectivity' which guides the process of observation and analysis. This notion, is based on a firmly held belief that it is possible for a researcher to free him or herself completely from the interests, ideology and values he or she may possess as an individual or as a member of a group. It is this belief that makes it possible for the method to state the researcher's own motives, interests and values, as if they constituted the 'facts' about the reality itself.

Since any action unencompassed by the method, either on the part of the researcher or the 'subject' constitutes an interference to the observation process, signals arising from such a world of action are treated as a chaotic noise factor. The elimination of such noise factor is sought to be achieved with the help of the 'method itself'. By using filters provided by the categories of formal, deductive logic, the 'method' helps the researcher to select those chunks of reality which, when subjected to observation and analysis, are amenable to an 'objective' treatment. Such a 'made-to-order' reality is the only reality the 'scientific method' admits of. And 'objectivity', which is claimed to be the prime virtue of the 'method', lies in detaching not only the observation process but knowledge itself from the reality of which it is a systematised construct. Objectivity of the scientific method, thus, is a composite of the language and procedures used by the researcher and sanctioned by the canons of formal logic. It has little to do with the terms in which reality itself exists or the internal principles on which its existence rests.

Such a commitment to formal knowledge informs much of the thinking and activity in the field of development. The 'models' of development, being products of this knowledge process, lack commitment to change the reality. For, in this scheme, reality cannot become anything different from what the method permits to observe and infer about it. In this sense the very idea of development is straight-jacketed in the *method* of development which the 'models' explicate. If, however, the course meanders away from the straight and narrow path which the models prescribe, the change by definition become 'non-developmental' and such facts about it are banished as being extraneous to the 'models'.

Secondly, the method tends to dehumanise the relationship between the researcher and other human beings who are its 'subjects'. The researcher's relationship to subjects is meant to be non-interactive, a one-way process in which the researcher approaches his subjects as if they were speaking machines programmed to speak a language which the researcher's instruments can codify. To change the metaphor slightly, for the researcher reality is dumb and the method gives its 'subjects' their tongues by means of which he induces reality to speak to him. The relationship is of a man to a machine and not one between one human being and another.

Such mechanomorphisation of reality is inherent in the method because reality must be made to fit the structure of knowledge which is essentially mechanistic. The resultant fitting of reality to pre-conceived categories is called the researcher's 'construction' of reality. But the 'construction', once arrived at, acquires an existence of its own, apart from and independent of both the researcher and his subjects, to which neither have any commitment or responsibility. It is in this sense that in the positivist practice both the researcher and the 'subjects' have no freedom of action either to view or change reality outside the perimeters set by the method. All other manifestations of reality, not represented in its 'construction', are de-legitimised simply because the 'rationally conceived design' of observation and analysis cannot explain them. The researcher is expected to treat such manifestations of reality as are not amenable to his 'design' not as a limitation of the method but as evidence of 'irrational' and 'unscientific' modes of cognition of which he may be a victim. It then becomes his duty to social science to overcome such modes of cognition.

Further, for validation of knowledge the 'method' does not require the researcher to refer his 'construction' back to reality. It lies in similar constructions made by other researchers following the same 'method'. Validation is thus sought through the internal consistencies of observed facts. But this is already assured by the categories used for observation. In this sense the validation of positivist social knowledge lies primarily in the language structure of instrumental rationality which the method articulates, rather than is actors shaping and changing the reality. Any other kind of knowledge is considered 'unvalidated' and 'unscientific', knowledge on which no policy or development action can be based, may refer to is treated as 'unreality' (as if it did not exist) or 'counter-reality' representing 'irrational' elements of the reality that must be eventually brought under the control of 'rational knowledge'.

Knowledge, Power and Social Action

It is in the logic of the 'method' of social science to produce a monopoly of knowledge. Knowledge is alienated from those about whom the knowledge is supposed to be and for whom it is meant to be used. It is then held by the 'experts' and 'specialists'. The power of such a

knowledge, in the ultimate analysis, lies not in the appeal it can have for the subjects or in the 'authentication' it may find in their individual biographies, but in the efficacy of the instruments of coercion, control and mobilisation that are available in the power system, outside the knowledge system. The demonstration of the truth content of such knowledge is seen in the power and efficacy of the institutional structures to induce desired and expected behaviours among the subjects (of development) and all other motivations and behaviour on their part are considered non-developmental or even anti-developmental. The 'social scientific' knowledge system thus provides a justification for the power system. Such a knowledge system has no means to devise on its own the institutional and other means for determining how the knowledge it has thus generated shall be used in the society. It is for this reason that a purely epistemological critique of positivist social knowledge, devoid of a critical analysis of how it is internally linked with the institutional structures of power, is incapable of initiating any thinking or action on alternatives.

The use of positivist knowledge is determined neither by the researchers nor by the subjects, but by the institutions of the power structure. This is because, as Habermas puts it, the positivist sciences "produce technical recommendations, but they furnish no answer to practical queries. Emancipation by means of enlightenment is replaced by instruction in control over objective or objectified process".³ Put differently, since products of positivist knowledge are alienated from both the researchers and the subjects, they become a charge of the political-bureaucratic and the technocratic elites at whose command lies the coercive apparatus of the state. It becomes their 'business' to see that the 'subject population' (rather, the 'target' population) is pushed towards the 'logical' course of development as delineated by positivist research. This is because such reified knowledge stakes claims about all 'relevant', if not complete knowledge of the reality. The model of development, based as it is on such a knowledge, then becomes unidimensional and totalising.

³ Jurgen Habermas, "Theory and Practice in a Scientific Civilization", (p.331) in Paul Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology*, Penguin: England, 1978, pp.330-362.

To be sure, control or coercion is not always applied to maintain the linearity of the developmental process upheld by positivist knowledge. Usually, the state and/or the Development agencies with their 'extension' and mobilisational programmes of development uses a large machinery that places emphasis on a methodology of 'involving people' in the process of development. Not infrequently, these agencies talk about 'felt needs', 'regional planning' and even participation of people in development. But all this is aimed at efficient realisation of the *given* goals of development. And, these goals are usually set by the power-system in the society. The 'rational' and 'scientific' knowledge system, itself being considered as objective and value free is, thus, given its purpose by the power system. In effect, the knowledge system, working in conjunction with power system seeks to influence reality. In that process it depends not on rationality but on manipulation and coercion. In the words of Habermas, such positivist social knowledge, "is no longer directed towards the consciousness of human beings who live together and discuss matters with each other, but to the behaviour of human beings who manipulate."⁴ It thus, 'confuses control with action!'.⁵

Thus viewed, in the Development paradigm which is informed by positivist knowledge the relationship between the developers and their subjects, (usually identified as 'target' population), and more generally between knowledge and action, is an imperatively ordered structure in which the knowledge system has coagulated into a power system.

II

Democratization of Knowledge and Power: Initiatives from the Grassroots

The thinking in the grassroot movements on the issue of knowledge-power relationship is, by and large, shaped by their experience of dealing with the 'experts' advising the Government and various international

⁴ Habermas (note 3), p.332.

⁵ Habermas (note 3), p.332.

agencies in the planning and implementation of Development projects which the activists for alternative development tend to oppose. Their opposition to such projects is no longer confined only to mobilizing the projects affected populations in protest. They have to increasingly contend with 'technical' arguments the experts put forward in defense of the development projects. The experts, claiming 'objective' knowledge and political neutrality, couch their argument in terms of long-term national interest the projects can serve and benefits which might accrue to populations much larger than 'the few' adversely affected by them. The activists repudiate these claims on the basis of social knowledge they acquire by working with, and for the people. The knowledge of the ground reality thus acquired enables them to articulate cultural rights of the populations displaced by the projects often in terms perceived as 'anti-developmental' by the developers who conceive Development as *the* scientific method for human progress.

This ongoing confrontation on the ground between experts and the activists has, over time, expanded into a larger public discourse. The issues in the discourse raised by the activist groups range from their challenging the experts' method of calculating cost and benefits of the projects, their evaluation of the projects' impact on environment to pressing rights of the affected populations to protect their livelihood patterns and cultural identities. They, often, also work out alternative proposals for development of the affected area and the people living in it. In contrast to the Government projects their proposals, they claim, can avoid uprooting of populations, are environment-friendly and cost-effective. Through this process, the activist groups have been able to bring into focus of the debate their central concern, i.e. to challenge the prevailing model of Development and create a politics for alternative development.

This experience of activist groups is yet to crystallize in any new theoretical understanding on their part about the relationship they seek to establish between social knowledge and people's empowerment which would replace the prevailing nexus between the elite power and the positivist social knowledge. But what is clearly discernible from the debate they have raised about the 'role of experts' in development, is their distrust for any macro theorization and codification of social knowledge. In their view, the prevailing codification of knowledge binds

action to a status-quo and serves hegemonic power in the society. They believe that what is required is not any theory, but politics of action to emerge from the concrete struggles of the people themselves. The knowledge produced through the process of action can, in their view, be held and used by those who have produced it. Since its producers are also the users of such knowledge, it can not reify itself into an autonomous power system.

On the whole, such movement-generated knowledge remains local and specific. It is held in form of skills and insights developed by its users who are its producers. These are often sought to be expanded through programmes of self-evaluation and through interactions and dialogues between action groups (i.e. among the user-producers themselves). Yet, it is far from acquiring a generalized form. In fact the practitioners of this new knowledge have a distrust of any generalized form of knowledge. The result is that the larger discourse on the national and international issues continue to remain dominated by the mainstream ideologies and theories. Even the grassroots activists of alternative development often support public positions on such issues making a derivative use of the macro-discourse, the terms of which are formulated by politicians and intellectuals operating from within the prevailing matrix of political power. These, often, do not resonate with the activists' own understanding and experience of problems at the ground level.

An alternative theory of action, therefore, requires that the grassroots thinking and movements must consolidate, if not formalise, the new knowledge. This is possible only if the activists become their own theorists and the intellectuals working with them find authentication of their thinking through their own role located within the movements. When this happens, knowledge ceases to be viewed as the pursuit of expertise, and action as the 'implementation' of some body's idea. Instead, it sets in motion a participative process which not only obliterates the distinction between the subject and the object, between the producers and the consumers of knowledge, but also creates a durable knowledge-base which serves people's own empowerment, rather than the hegemonic structures of power in the society.

Experiments in this direction were initiated in 1970's by some action-movement groups in Latin America, Asia and Africa.⁶ In the course of two decades these experiments have acquired what can be described as a pedagogic form of political action; they seek to invent new forms of political action simultaneously aimed at democratization and de-monopolisation of both the knowledge and the power systems in the society. These initiatives have been primarily focused on generating new social knowledge for alternative development. By activating and involving networks of people's organizations in this new knowledge process they seek to detach at crucial points of its linkages with the macro structure of power in the society. The method employed is of dialogues, interactions and participative research. The overall knowledge-action process is known as Participative Action Research (PAR).⁷

⁶ These experiments were initially concerned with evolving a methodology of 'micro-development' that enabled people to participate directly in formulating and executing programmes for their own well-being. See, for example, W. Haque, N. Mehta, A. Rahaman and P. Wigna Raja, "Towards a Theory of Rural Development", *Development Dialogue*, 1997:2. Also see, G.V.S. deSilva, N. Mehta, A. Rahaman, P. Wigna Raja: "Bhoomisena: A Struggle for People's Power", *Development Dialogue* (1979:2). While the knowledge-power linkage was only implicitly recognized the primary emphasis in these initiatives was on organizing collective effort of local communities for creating and harnessing resources for their development and, in the process confronting the power structures for retaining control over their resources. For report on these initiatives covering the earlier phase, in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America see Amit Bhaduri and Anisur Rahaman (eds.), *Studies in Rural Participation*, Oxford, New Delhi, 1982.

⁷ A comprehensive statement on the philosophy and practice of PAR and a series of *process* studies illustrating various dimensions of PAR thinking and practice is provided in Orlando Fals-Borda and Anisur Rahaman (eds.), *Action and Knowledge: Breaking the Monopoly with Participatory Action Research*, Apex Press, New York, 1991. Also see, Anisur Rahaman, "The Theory and Practice of Participatory Action Research", in Orlando Fals-Borda (ed.), *The Challenge of Social Change*, Sage, London, 1985.

Participative Action Research (PAR) was initially looked upon by its practitioners as a means of bridging the gap between knowledge and action, between development and underdevelopment. Through its sustained practice in different locales and communities it has succeeded in involving people in the process of creating and using knowledge for their own empowerment. People defining their own problems and finding solutions for themselves has created in them a sense of power they had not experienced before.⁸ Despite all this, the PAR experience remains bound to specific locales. Its reportage is often in form of case studies or record of experiments in PAR. The larger goal of creating a new theory of knowledge, a pedagogy of participative democracy and a new conception of politics still remains distant. This is because, in practice, PAR remains tied to local struggles. The emphasis is on the method and strategies of action. It is primarily viewed as form of action, rather than the process of generating and legitimizing new social knowledge for social transformation; the knowledge which sustains processes of diffusion and decentralization of power in the society as a whole. In my view, for PAR to move in the direction of achieving its larger goal, clarity on the following questions need to be achieved:

- (i) Is PAR primarily a form of action in which knowledge is generated through 'learning from experience' and through analyses of action already undertaken? Or, is it also a form of critical consciousness, an alternative mode of understanding and changing social reality? If the latter, it should enable a choice of right action in any situation through reflection, rather than reproducing the same action-experience of learning.

⁸ For various reports on how PAR practice has catalysed peoples organizations for creating countervailing processes of power and knowledge see, Orlando Fals-Borda, *Knowledge and People's Power: Lessons with Peasants from Nicaragua, Mexico and Columbia*, Indian Social Institute, Delhi, 1985. Contributions in the volume represent an earlier phase of PAR in which attempts were made to problematise the issue of participation in terms of democratization of the knowledge-power system.

(ii) If PAR is conceived primarily as a form of action, is it not likely that it will be seen merely as an improvement on the prevalent bureaucratic form or method of 'development'? Put, differently, is PAR a method that seeks to explicate the goals of development (which are more or less given) to the people such that it invites their participation in achieving them? Or, is it a process of self-knowledge and self-development by which people arrive at their own definition of development and find out for themselves what is development and what is *mal* development?

(iii) If PAR is to be looked upon *simultaneously* as a process of social knowledge and social action, is it sufficient that PAR is defined only in terms of *method*, as is done today by its practitioners? Or, should the whole question of participative research be approached as a process that aims at changing both the nature of social knowledge and the nature of development itself?

In brief, whether PAR will be used for 'efficient' realisation of the given goals of development and thus be co-opted by the prevalent knowledge-power nexus or will initiate and sustain an alternative process of development will depend on whether the new knowledge is viewed merely as a bye-product of action or a means of changing power relationships in the society.

Thus, if PAR is meant really to serve as an interface between the worlds of knowledge and action so that fresh thinking on the goals, processes and indicators of development becomes possible in the society, it will have to be dissociated from the prevalent structures of positivist knowledge and elite power. To conclude with Habermas, the positivist knowledge, far from freeing man from his physical and spiritual slavery has itself grown into a new bondage. This can only be altered by a change in the state of consciousness itself, by the practical effect of a theory which does not improve the manipulation of things and of reification of ideas but which instead advances the interest of reason in human adulthood, in the autonomy of action and in the liberation from dogmatism.⁹

⁹ Habermas (note 3) p.333.

I.P. Desai Memorial Lecture Series

- 1 Ramkrishna Mukherjee, *I.P. Desai and Sociology of India* (1986).
- 2 A.R. Desai, *Rural Development and Human Rights of the Agrarian Poor in Independent India* (1987).
- 3 Yogendra Singh, *Social Processes and Dimensions of Indian Nationalism* (1988).
- 4 M.S. Gore, *Social Movements and the Paradigm of Functional Analysis* (1989).
- 5 Rajni Kothari, *Social Policy, Development and Democracy* (1990).
- 6 A.M. Shah, *The Judicial and Sociological View of the Other Backward Classes* (1992).
- 7 Y.B. Damle, *Theory, Rhetoric and Social Reality* (1993).
- 8 Jan Breman, *Labour Nomads in South Gujarat* (1994).
- 9 Krishna Ahooja-Patel, *Towards a New Social Order in India* (1996).
- 10 Suma Chitnis, *The Crisis in Higher Education* (1997).
- 11 Krishna Kumar, *Education and Society in Post-Independence India - Looking Towards the Future* (1998).